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RECOVERING CITIZENSHIP AND 
GOVERNMENT FROM POLITICS: 
A RETURN TO THE FOUNDING 
Forrest A. Nabors* 
DANIELLE ALLEN, OUR DECLARATION: A READING OF THE DECLARATION 
OF INDEPENDENCE IN DEFENSE OF EQUALITY (W. W. NORTON & 
COMPANY 2014). PP. 315. PAPERBACK $19.95. 
SANFORD LEVINSON, AN ARGUMENT OPEN TO ALL: READING THE 
FEDERALIST IN THE 21ST CENTURY (YALE UNIVERSITY PRESS 2015). 
PP. 350. HARDCOVER $38.00. 
At this writing, just before Election Day in 2016, it is not too early to predict 
that this year will be remembered for uncommonly nasty partisanship, rivaling 
America’s most degraded national political contests. We have witnessed revelations 
of appalling conduct behind closed doors, mob violence at political rallies all over 
the country, and jaw-dropping recriminations leveled by both presidential candi-
dates against each other. Polls have revealed broad and unprecedented dissatisfac-
tion among Americans for both presidential candidates. The general feeling of the 
electorate seems to be that regardless of who is chosen president on Election Day, 
the people will have selected the one judged least bad, not the one judged best. Yet, 
we know that clouds already hovered above national political life before the spec-
tacular events of this year darkened them further. Entering 2016 low approval rat-
ings of Congress were already customary, regularly bouncing around a range below 
the approval ratings of our last two presidents. Increasingly, the electorate has iden-
tified as independent and has withheld affiliating with the major parties. Americans 
seem well aware that the professionals in whom they have entrusted honest repre-
sentation of their political views have failed them. 
But here, we might pause to see hope in the storm. Popular revulsion may be 
a sign that partisanship has not cut into the electorate beyond the professionals and 
activists. The latter comprise the actors engaged in tawdry political theater and it 
might be a mistake to confound them with the repulsed audience. This separation 
could be explained by the thesis of Morris Fiorina, who argued that the American 
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people are not so intensely polarized as the political class.1 Americans of many po-
litical stripes are united in disgust. Aristotle observed that popular disgust for ex-
tremism is a sign of deeper political health, because it shows that the size of the 
middling element willing to obey reason is substantial.2 Hopefully, conditions are 
ripening for cooler heads to cross discredited partisan lines and join in constructive 
discussion and debate that the American people would welcome. 
Perhaps we can take comfort in the defensible observation that the seeds of 
renewal are sometimes found in declension, and perhaps decline itself plants those 
seeds. Our infamous year might loosen the ties that bind the American people to 
stale partisan creeds and policy agendas and open them to new ideas about our po-
litical life and government. If we take advantage of these conditions, thoughtful 
Americans can make good use of two new books, Danielle Allen’s Our Declaration: 
A Reading of the Declaration of Independence In Defense Of Equality, and a study of the 
Federalist essays, Sanford Levinson’s An Argument Open to All: Reading The Federalist in 
the 21st Century.3 Both return to our national origins in order to reflect on the pre-
sent. In a political moment like ours, there is no better place to begin anew than at 
the beginning, to shore up our vandalized national edifice. 
Purged of academic jargon, the highly readable Our Declaration would be a Jane 
Austen heroine at a dinner party, if books were people. Allen is an affable and de-
ceptively modest writer, and she engages everyone at their level. Her book refers to 
the divorce between Prince Charles and Princess Diana, the poetry of Sylvia Plath, 
the indictment of Linda Tripp, and other examples drawn from ordinary life and 
popular culture in order to patiently explain complex concepts implicated by the 
Declaration.4 This is in keeping with her stated intention “to draw different circles 
of readers together.”5 But, like a Jane Austen heroine, her book is full of erudition 
and runs deep. At many points, Allen’s fellow travelers who also have studied and 
revere the Declaration will receive a jolt from a new revelation that she has uncov-
ered. Our Declaration has vaulted Allen into the front ranks of the Declaration’s de-
fenders. As she notes, there are few studies like hers that treat the Declaration as a 
philosophical argument rather than as an historic episode.6 Her book should be 
paired with Carl Becker’s The Declaration of Independence: A Study in the History of Politi-
cal Ideas as a study of contrasts.7 For Allen, the Declaration is always relevant, and 
                                                          
 1. See MORRIS P. FIORINA, DISCONNECT: THE BREAKDOWN OF REPRESENTATION IN AMERICAN POLITICS 
(2009). 
 2. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS bk. IV, 1295a34-1295b34 (Carnes Lord trans., Univ. of Chicago Press ed. 1984) (c. 
384-322 BCE). Citations of Aristotle use the numbering system devised by Immanuel Bekker. 
 3. DANIELLE ALLEN, OUR DECLARATION: A READING OF THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE IN 
DEFENSE OF EQUALITY (2014); SANFORD LEVINSON, AN ARGUMENT OPEN TO ALL: READING THE 
FEDERALIST IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2015). 
 4. ALLEN, supra note 3, at 94, 102, 207-08. 
 5. Id. at 43. 
 6. Id. at 34. 
 7. CARL BECKER, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: A STUDY IN THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL IDEAS 
(1922). 
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she seeks to re-animate it for the American people.8 Becker historicizes the Decla-
ration. For him, its time is past; it is obsolete. 
This is a welcome book to those of us who are warmed by the confession of 
Abraham Lincoln when he surveyed the scene of the Declaration’s birth, that “all 
the political sentiments I entertain have been drawn . . . from the sentiments which 
originated, and were given to the world from this hall.”9 That short, emotional ad-
dress in Independence Hall on February 22, 1861 also reminds us that Allen’s book 
is necessary. On the eve of Lincoln’s inauguration, the threat of assassination hung 
over him precisely because of his filial devotion to our founding document. In a 
sense, the Civil War was fought to either raise our Declaration higher or tear it 
down. 
We need Allen’s book because formidable foes, ranging from bitter enemies 
to unconvinced critics, always have swelled the ranks arrayed against the Declara-
tion. The Declaration has been, and sometimes still is, dismissed as a bundle of glit-
tering generalities or as essentialist myth-making. The Declaration’s assertion that 
“all men are created equal” has been assailed variously as erroneous, a self-evident 
lie and inclusive only of white males. The passive disparagement of the Declaration 
in our own day is evident even in scholarship that implicitly adopts the principles of 
the Declaration for its moral premise. One eminent study of past advances toward 
racial equality in America omits the Declaration among the decisive factors that the 
authors highlight. Their omission does not seem quite right when one considers 
those periods of racial progress and the rising popularity of the Declaration’s lan-
guage, which was weaponized by successful civil rights movements.10 An argument 
could be crafted from Our Declaration showing that the close historical coincidence 
between successful agitations for greater freedom in American political history and 
wider appeals to the Declaration was a causal relationship, and not accidental. 
Allen argues that the Declaration “helps us see that we cannot have freedom 
without equality.”11 Political philosophy has erroneously taught “that equality and 
freedom are necessarily in tension with each other,” and Americans “have swal-
lowed this argument whole.”12 Our Declaration sets out to correct this malnourish-
ment. In summary of her book, the Declaration shows that equality is the surest 
guarantor of freedom. It is an unusual document because although it consists of 
words like any other, its words are actions that are aligned to the precepts about 
equality that it contains. In other words, the Declaration marks a kind of genesis: a 
mysterious moment of self-enlightenment or spontaneous self-awakening to natural 
equality upon which a people composing a new nation stakes and maintains its 
claim to the right to be free. Further, it is unusually apt at inspiring new self-
                                                          
 8. ALLEN, supra note 3, at 42. 
 9. 4 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 240 (Roy P. Basler ed., Rutgers Univ. Press, 1953) 
[hereinafter COLLECTED WORKS OF LINCOLN]. 
 10. PHILIP A. KLINKNER & ROGERS M. SMITH, THE UNSTEADY MARCH: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF RACIAL 
EQUALITY IN AMERICA 4 (1999). 
 11. ALLEN, supra note 3, at 21 (emphasis original). 
 12. Id. at 23. 
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awakenings across the ages by being read and studied. The Declaration is an active 
power for freedom, and equality is its foundation. 
The brief Prologue unveils Allen’s argument and its urgency. Part I relates 
chapters in her personal life in order to bear witness to the enduring importance of 
the Declaration. Parts II & III provide a concise history of the drafting process, 
proving that it would be mistaken to reflexively think of the Declaration as the 
product of Jefferson’s isolated retreat into his study. In fact, its language passed 
through many hands and many conversations.13 This is important because the 
terms of justice found in the Declaration, which they wrote together, requires group 
writing.14 Part IV through most of Part VIII is where the heavy lifting of the book 
takes place. Allen walks the reader through a careful exegesis of the text of the Dec-
laration.15 The goal of this section is to uncover five facets of equality in the Decla-
ration’s argument.16 The Epilogue connects the general argument of the book to 
the meaning of equality previously explained.17 Although her history of the drafting 
process is interesting and convincing, the parts that deserve most scrutiny are her 
personal reflections and the exegesis. 
In Part I, Allen discloses surprisingly intimate details about her personal life, 
but there is more to her meaning than might meet the hasty eye. This section 
demonstrates the power of the Declaration to teach its seminal lessons; to elevate 
and unify citizenship; to illustrate how each of us is strengthened by our individual 
recognition of natural equality; and to show why liberty is fleeting in political society 
unless that liberty is grounded in equality.18 
She recounts how her “life-tested night students” at the University of Chicago 
engrossed the Declaration for the first time and read it closely with her.19 The 
working night students knew even less than the little that her more privileged day 
students knew about the Declaration, but at the end of their study, they were trans-
formed.20 The Declaration had taught them the profound meaning of who they and 
we all are – naturally equal human beings and inheritors of a nation founded upon 
the recognition that this is who we all are.21 Her students saw and grasped their pat-
rimony.22 They gained a new vocabulary to speak about politics and their citizen-
ship gained new life.23 Allen witnessed this effect on her students, which trans-
formed her, and gave her a new appreciation for the power of the Declaration. 
                                                          
 13. Id. at 80-81. 
 14. Id. at 103. 
 15. Id. at 107-267. 
 16. ALLEN, supra note 3, at 108-09.  
 17. Id. at 275-82. 
 18. Id. at 36-44. 
 19. Id. at 33. 
 20. Id.  
 21. ALLEN, supra note 3, at 38. 
 22. Id. at 35. 
 23. Id.  
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Second, Allen relates her family history. She is a child of a biracial marriage.24 
Her African-American father left Florida because he tired of racial prejudice.25 Her 
white mother descended from Michigan Progressives.26 Around their dinner table, 
they discussed freedom and equality and the Declaration of Independence.27 Then 
she shares a painful story. When her mentally ill maternal grandmother was undiag-
nosed and untreated, she subjected the youthful Allen to cruelty.28 With the help of 
her family, she learned to ignore her grandmother’s barbs and to quietly insist to 
herself that in an important and appropriate sense she was equal to her adult white 
grandmother.29 This gave her the strength to bear the difficulty and left her with a 
lasting memory that later motivated her to teach others and give them similar 
strength.30 She learned how to dismiss attempts to debase her by mentally embrac-
ing the meaning of natural equality, that none may be exalted above another nor 
debased below another with justice.31 At a young age, she knew that her grand-
mother had erred. 
But in most political societies, we cannot secure our liberty by ignoring would-
be tyrants. The book of Exodus in the Bible drove this lesson home for her.32 Alt-
hough Joseph enjoyed liberty and prosperity under the pleased eye of Pharaoh, an-
other Pharaoh succeeded to the throne who “knew not Joseph” and enslaved his 
descendants.33 This taught her that only the establishment of equality as the stand-
ard for political life can assure the perpetuity of liberty. Without equality, the sur-
vival of liberty is subject to the caprice of rulers. 
Taken together, Allen’s personal reflections suggest how the Declaration 
solves the problem of division by identity and creates union among the citizenry, 
securing freedom for all. Defenders of the Declaration have long believed this. This 
is evident in another speech that Lincoln gave to an earlier generation of “life-
tested” Chicagoans, 150 years before Allen’s cohort. Lincoln estimated that perhaps 
as many as half of all Americans at that time were not descended by blood and flesh 
from the generation that was present during the American Revolution.34 But 
when they look through that old Declaration of Independence they find that those 
old men say that “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created 
equal,” and then they feel that that moral sentiment taught in that day evidences their 
relation to those men, that it is the father of all moral principle in them, and that they 
have a right to claim it as though they were blood of the blood, and flesh of the flesh 
                                                          
 24. Id. at 36-37. 
 25. Id. at 36. 
 26. ALLEN, supra note 3, at 37. 
 27. Id. at 36-38. 
 28. Id. at 39-40. 
 29. Id. at 40. 
 30. Id.  
 31. ALLEN, supra note 3, at 40. 
 32. Id. at 41. 
 33. Id.  
 34. 2 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 499 (Roy P. Basler ed., Rutgers Univ. Press, 1953). 
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of the men who wrote that Declaration, (loud and long continued applause) and so 
they are.35 
That is, blood and flesh do not constitute our most important civic bond that, 
like an electric cord, vivifies the merely legal union of citizenship. Our common 
humanity is the only condition for eligibility to partake of that bond. Our devotion 
to those words constitutes that bond, and converts us all into the descendants of 
the Founding Fathers who wrote those words, much in the same way that belief in 
and devotion to the truths revealed by religion convert people into inheritors of the 
promises of their god, who becomes their common father. The votaries become 
one family, united and transformed by their faith. Likewise, all who believe and de-
vote their way of life to the words in the Declaration can claim the founders as our 
common fathers, and can claim their work, the Declaration and its recognition of 
our equality, as a patrimony that belongs to all of us. We can all be their true inheri-
tors. If our legal union is imbued with this character, we are impregnable against 
tyranny from any quarter because we will be prepared to spring to the defense of 
each other’s liberty when danger comes. 
This time, the teacher is not Lincoln but Allen, an African-American woman 
who insists on claiming her full share of our common patrimony given to us by the 
Declaration.36 But how can she reconcile that inheritance and the bleaker inher-
itance, the nation’s historic failings towards segments of our population, especially 
towards African-Americans? Her formal answer comes later in her book, arguing 
that the central idea of the Declaration gradually reformed illiberal habits that were 
inherited by the founding and contradictory to its founding ideal.37 This is a suffi-
cient answer, substantiated by Aristotle, who points out that habits cultivated by a 
pre-existing political regime can survive revolution and the establishment of a new 
regime.38 Her better answer is the whole book, and it is signified by the figure of 
Joseph, to whom she alluded in her short account of the Israelites in Egypt.39 Jo-
seph is an appropriate model for Allen’s project, which demonstrates and subtly 
explains how all members of historically oppressed groups can reconcile these con-
tradictory inheritances and contribute to liberating all from the burden of history. 
By their own treachery, Joseph’s brothers had him dragged into slavery. When 
they see Joseph the next time and behold his prosperity and power at the court of 
Pharaoh, they go down on their faces and beg for forgiveness. But Joseph tells 
them, “Do not be afraid . . . you meant evil against me; but God meant it for good, 
in order to bring it about as it is this day, to save many people alive.”40 The hard 
path by which many kidnapped Africans found themselves in America became a 
hard residency, plagued by long affliction originating within the American family of 
                                                          
 35. Id. at 499-500 (quoting THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, ¶ 1 (1776)) [hereinafter THE 
DECLARATION]. 
 36. ALLEN, supra note 3, at 36. 
 37. Id. at 240-45. 
 38. ARISTOTLE, supra note 2.  
 39. ALLEN, supra note 3, at 107. 
 40. Genesis 50:19-20 (New King James Version). 
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citizens. This mass kidnapping and oppression was an incalculable evil. But the in-
tended evil put them in a position from which they eventually could rise and gain 
the right to claim an incalculable good, this patrimony. In Our Declaration, Allen 
summons her command of logic, etymology, history, and philosophy to teach this 
patrimony and “save many people alive.”41 Her detour into the personal burnishes 
the purpose of her project and prepares us to take it seriously. 
The first facet of equality that Allen wrings from the Declaration is the condi-
tion of being free from domination, which we might say is her working definition 
of liberty.42 The Declaration begins by referencing the “course of human events,” 
which revealed a pattern, an intention on the part of the British Crown to dominate 
the colonies.43 They were impelled, pushed “to assume among the powers of the 
earth” a “separate and equal station.”44 But she disclaims equating this pushing with 
historicist inevitability.45 The threat of domination did not foreordain that the colo-
nists would draw the appropriate lesson, and Allen stops short of explaining why 
they did draw that lesson and choose their fork in the river of events, rather than 
another. Probably, there is no explanation. Like philosophical instruction provided 
by the teacher in Plato’s Seventh Letter, domination can teach, but it cannot guar-
antee the enlightenment of the student, which happens by some inexplicable mira-
cle.46 In their encounter with the threat of domination, the Americans might have 
accepted the yoke, as some nations have done, and abandoned their founding ideal. 
The Declaration itself acknowledges this contingency, stating that “a Tyrant . . . is 
unfit to be the ruler of a free people.”47 That is, a people willing to be slaves is fit-
ted for a tyrant. But as a nation, the Americans had awakened to their natural equal-
ity, shook off the tyrannical pretension of the British government, and insisted, “We 
are your equals!”48 They chose the harder alternative, war, in order to escape domi-
nation and change the course of events.49 
But why did “the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God entitle them” to their 
new station?50 Allen answers, because the equal right to avoid domination and sur-
vive is fundamental.51 Here, and in many other places, the oldest strains of political 
philosophy are visible in her exegesis. Rebellion against domination is a justified 
second stroke in war, not the first stroke, Aquinas reminds us, because tyranny is 
                                                          
 41. ALLEN, supra note 3, at 107. 
 42. Id. at 122, 129. 
 43. Id. at 114 (discussing THE DECLARATION, ¶ 1). 
 44. Id. at 114, 119. 
 45. Id. at 132, 185. 
 46. Plato writes, “Thus much at least, I can say about all writers, past or future, who say they know the things 
to which I devote myself . . . . There neither is nor ever will be a treatise of mine on the subject. For it does not 
admit of exposition like other branches of knowledge; but after much converse about the matter itself and a life 
lived together, suddenly a light, as it were, is kindled in one soul by a flame that leaps to it from another, and there-
after sustains itself.” PLATO, THE PLATONIC EPISTLES 135 (J. Harward trans., Cambridge University Press, 1935). 
 47. ALLEN, supra note 3, at 30. 
 48. Id. at 119. 
 49. Id. at 111. 
 50. Id. at 130. 
 51. Id. at 134. 
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war already commenced.52 The proper purpose of war is peace, says Aristotle, and 
primarily should be undertaken to prevent becoming enslaved.53 Threatened domi-
nation pushed the Americans out of their former political order and pushed them 
into a new political order—their union. Allen writes, “political order emerges from 
the human need to gather together peaceably,” but in the old political order domi-
nation broke the peace.54 The colonists needed each other to restore peace. Their 
liberty and mutual recognition of their equal right to liberty became the basis of 
their new union. 
In this context, Allen addresses the thorny issue of God, noting that non-
believers in the present day are proliferating.55 Must we be theists, believing in 
merely some creator, in order to accept the argument of the Declaration with re-
spect to the natural right? Allen says no, and that we can set the question aside.56 In 
this instance, she seems to want to avoid contending with the difficult implications 
of changing religious opinion in our times. However, it is hard to see why inequality 
is any less justifiable than equality, if you knock down even the thinnest conception 
of a divinity. In fact, Allen describes such a conception: Aristotle’s “divine force” 
that “set the universe in motion . . . by giving everything in nature its goals or 
ends.”57 Of course, it is possible that support for equality can persist without ra-
tionally respectable justification. But is blind prejudice in support of equality a relia-
ble pillar? 
In one of the most striking stretches of the book, Allen carefully explains the 
famous second sentence beginning, “We hold these truths . . . that all men are cre-
ated equal” and reveals something new.58 She collapses the five claims beginning 
with the word “that,” into three categories: truths about human beings, truths about 
government, and the right of revolution.59 Restated, the famous second sentence is 
a syllogism with two premises, concluding that “[a]ll people have a right to a 
properly constituted government.”60 This is a valuable and persuasive analysis. 
This leads to the second facet of equality: the equal right of access to the in-
strument of government.61 This teaching depends on the phrase that the people 
have the right to arrange government “in such form, as to them shall seem most 
likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.”62 In Aristotelian fashion, Allen recog-
nizes that human beings are political by nature, because nature has given us the 
power to reason about self-protection and happiness.63 The Aristotelian claim is the 
                                                          
 52. SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS, ON KINGSHIP, TO THE KING OF CYPRUS 27 (Gerald B. Phelan trans., 1982). 
 53. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS bk VII, 1333b371333a30, 1333b35-1334a2. 
 54. ALLEN, supra note 3, at 117. 
 55. Id. at 134. 
 56. Id. at 138, 182. 
 57. Id. at 178-79. 
 58. Id. at 151-70 (quoting THE DECLARATION, ¶ 2). 
 59. ALLEN, supra note 3, at 153. 
 60. Id. at 166. 
 61. Id. at 176. 
 62. Id. at 184 (quoting THE DECLARATION, ¶ 2). 
 63. Id. at 173, 184. 
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implied premise of the Declaration, from which is derived this right of equal access, 
or, by the terms of our political society, equal civil and political rights. However, she 
seems to slightly err when she imputes the view to the Declaration that “None can 
judge better than I whether I am happy.”64 It would be closer to the truth to say 
that the Declaration recognizes that each of us are in the best position to judge our 
own happiness. It surely does not teach the view that each one’s opinion of his or 
her pursuit of happiness is unerringly true opinion. Politically, this slight difference 
in meaning is significant, for it cuts short debate about the good life, sanctifying 
every chosen activity as equally good. She is more convincing when she identifies a 
feature of the Declaration that is the most beautiful to her, its optimism that the 
people are capable of judging well.65 
Next comes the third facet of equality, the collective capacity of a people to 
acquire knowledge, specifically recognition of good and evil, or the exercise of “po-
litical judgment.”66 The sentence beginning, “Prudence, indeed, will dictate . . . ,” 
shows that the good judgment of the political community depends upon the ability 
of people to exercise prudence, distinguishing between sufferable and insufferable 
evils.67 That is the standard that a self-governing people must meet. The list of 
grievances, Allen convincingly argues, is not a formal indictment.68 It is “a model of 
political judgment. . . . in action,” that shows how a people should distinguish good 
and bad government.69 If the people can read and understand this model, then this 
proves the Declaration’s hypothesis, “that all people are created equal.”70 Allen’s 
night class proved the hypothesis no less than the Americans in 1776. 
The fourth facet of equality is the expectation of reciprocity or “a certain 
symmetry or equality between . . . actions.”71 This is modeled by the sentence, “In 
every stage of these Oppressions We have Petitioned for Redress . . . .”72 Once 
again, she reveals something striking, that the respective word counts of the recol-
lected petition and reply are precisely equal—ten words.73 This models reciprocity, 
the test of justice in civil relations among free and equal people. 
The fifth and last facet of equality is “co-creation and co-ownership of our 
shared world.”74 The British failed the test of reciprocity; therefore, the Americans 
declared to them, as their equals, that their political bands are abolished.75 Allen 
again surprises, recasting the entire document as a series of actions constituting an-
other syllogism. The Declaration says that a people may rebel against growing tyr-
                                                          
 64. ALLEN, supra note 3, at 184. 
 65. Id. at 183, 186. 
 66. Id. at 191, 228, 233. 
 67. Id. at 194 (quoting THE DECLARATION, ¶ 2). 
 68. Id. at 207-209. 
 69. ALLEN, supra note 3, at 228. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 249. 
 72. Id. at 246 (quoting THE DECLARATION, ¶ 3). 
 73. Id. at 249. 
 74. ALLEN, supra note 3, at 258. 
 75. Id. at 261. 
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anny; that King George was becoming a tyrant; and therefore, it is their right and 
duty to declare independence.76 They appeal to “a candid world” to publicly show 
the justice of their cause and they mutually stake their lives on the truth of what 
they say.77 Their joint actions demonstrated mutual responsibility for their actions, 
modeling how a political order based upon equality should conduct itself in the 
presence of humanity.78 
In closing, Allen writes, “the achievement of equality is the sole foundation on 
which we can build lasting and meaningful freedom . . . .”79 Surely, it is easy to ac-
cept the position that natural equality is the only firm basis of liberty. Tyrants of all 
kinds who have robbed freedom from others have always found refuge in the self-
serving assertion of natural inequality. But, Allen unconvincingly continues, this “is 
a fundamentally anti-libertarian argument,” made more urgent because liberty has 
drubbed equality in our public life.80 Is it true that liberty has soared while equality 
(at least in the sense that she means it) has taken a beating? Allen offers little proof 
to support this observation. More importantly, she isolates and criticizes the de-
fense of greater liberty as a threat to equality, as if liberty and equality are competi-
tors in a zero-sum game.81 She maintains that liberty is not possible without equali-
ty, which is well-taken, but seems to find that equality is possible, perhaps even 
preferable, without the broadest liberty.82 It could be argued that liberty and equali-
ty are mutually dependent in the Declaration, and that the diminution of one neces-
sarily diminishes the other. Although Allen’s argument justifying the urgency of the 
book is exposed to criticism of this kind, it consumes only a small part of the book. 
The only other problem worth notice is her assimilation of the “separate but 
equal” doctrine and the “separate and equal station” passage of the Declaration.83 
Allen argues the passage from the Declaration provided grounds for segregationists 
to oppress others.84 However, these ideas are incommensurable. Self-segregation to 
vindicate liberty and equality is very different from forced segregation, for the pur-
pose of oppression, justified by the false claim that the segregated were equal. Tyr-
anny always borrows and perverts the language of liberty to hide its designs. This 
brief passage should have been cut. 
Nevertheless, these minor defects hardly detract from the great value of the 
whole. Allen’s ringing final appeal for wider studies of the Declaration is a good 
ending, given all that she has explained so beautifully about its power, which she 
witnessed in her personal life.85 We learn that a citizenry well-versed in the Declara-
tion naturally will grow in affection for equality, liberty, and humanity. Then they 
                                                          
 76. Id. at 260-65. 
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can smoothly move to inquiring into the form and structure of our government, 
which is endued with the responsibility to preserve American equality and liberty, 
and to respect the equality and liberty belonging to others. 
The form and structure of our government in actual operation is taken up by 
Levinson. An Argument Open To All consists of commentary on each of all eighty-
five Federalist essays.86 Typically, studies of the Federalist use the essays to better 
understand the political theory of Publius or scour them for evidence establishing 
the original meaning of the Constitution. The task that Levinson assigns to himself 
is different. He informs the reader that his “presentist” study attempts to address 
political questions in our day.87 Levinson identifies vexing problems foreseen and 
not foreseen by Publius, problems the Constitution failed to foreclose. The book 
brims with illustrative examples from early to recent history of the republic. His 
commentary is provocative by design, which is immediately evident. 
Federalist 1 addresses the character and capacity of the American people to 
govern themselves.88 Publius famously predicted that their conduct would decide 
“the important question, whether societies of men are really capable or not of es-
tablishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever 
destined to depend for their political constitutions on accident and force.”89 Levin-
son doubts that Americans have proven that they can be trusted to discuss and de-
cide “absolutely basic questions at the heart of governance.”90 He asks, “Do we 
think that is possible today, or is it a quixotic, even potentially dangerous fanta-
sy?”91 Regarding the claim that Americans were “one united people” in Federalist 2, 
Levinson demonstrates its “utter fatuity” as an empirical fact when it was written, 
and instead interprets Publius to be emphasizing the importance of homogeneity.92 
Due to the nation’s moderate success at maintaining stability despite our heteroge-
neity, he asks whether the “belief about the significance of homogeneity was com-
pletely without merit?”93 But he also poses an alternative view, that our heterogene-
ity has undermined our bonds, that the idea we are one united citizenry is a fiction, 
and that “our political system is so wholly committed to interest-group politics that 
it is completely legitimate for a voter . . . to be concerned exclusively with his or her 
private interests,” especially the partial interests of identity groups.94 Federalist 9 
and 10 argue that the extended republic curbs faction.95 Levinson approvingly 
points out that religion is cited by Publius as a catalyst of faction, and he suggests 
adding another to the list of catalysts, patriotism, which “can easily lead to the deni-
                                                          
 86. LEVINSON, supra note 3. 
 87. Id. at 3. 
 88. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 1 (Alexander Hamilton) (The Gideon ed. 2001) [hereinafter FEDERALIST]. 
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 93. Id. at 17. 
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gration of those who are not members of that community. . . .”96 Hence, Levinson 
is suspicious of moral, religious, and certain kinds of civic education, and he sug-
gests that the extended republic created by the Constitution only “provides some 
marginal protection.”97 He hints that the expansion of secularism and the ebb or 
redefinition of patriotism will improve our odds against factionalism. 
Regarding the interior or institutional structure of the government, Levinson 
is equally critical. National elections are insufficiently democratic, even after major 
reforms. The right to vote “remains an extraordinary volatile political issue.”98 Most 
congressional elections are not competitive.99 Because our population has increased 
so much, the proportionately smaller House of Representatives inadequately repre-
sents constituents.100 Regardless of widely diverging populations, all states send ex-
actly two Senators to Washington, and therefore, the Senate is malapportioned.101 
The secondary consequence is that the Electoral College malapportions voting 
power in presidential elections.102 
The theory of the separation of powers outlined in Federalist 51 has failed, 
Levinson argues, because although Publius soberly recognized that partisanship is 
an eternal fact of political life, he fatally missed foreseeing the rise and strength of 
organized parties, which reward loyalty and punish disloyalty in public service.103 
Advancement is impossible without party support, which has strengthened the role 
of partisanship in government.104 Because party discipline aligns public servants 
against each other, the separation of powers has “yielded endless gridlock and inef-
fective government.”105 The Senate and the presidents have increasingly clashed 
over foreign policy and nominations.106 Presidents have resorted to using the de-
nomination “agreements” for treaties in substance, in order to skirt the duty to seek 
ratification by the Senate.107 Publius did not foresee this, although he recognized 
“unsettling implications” if a president were to settle foreign policy without Senate 
participation.108 He did foresee the possibility that the Senate and president might 
reach impasse over a nomination.109 But he predicted that the rules would favor the 
president because the Senate would have to fear that after the rejection of one nom-
inee, the president would nominate another candidate even more distasteful.110 
Levinson acknowledges that despite increasingly contentious nomination battles, 
                                                          
 96. LEVINSON, supra note 3, at 43-44. 
 97. Id. at 44. 
 98. Id. at 198. 
 99. Id. at 202. 
 100. See id. at 206-220. 
 101. LEVINSON, supra note 3, at 236-37. 
 102. Id. at 260-61. 
 103. See id. at 191-196 (discussing FEDERALIST, supra note 88, No. 51. (James Madison), at 267-72). 
 104. Id. at 196. 
 105. Id. at 195. 
 106. LEVINSON, supra note 3, at 241-245. 
 107. Id. at 242-43. 
 108. Id. at 286-87. 
 109. Id. at 288-92 (discussing FEDERALIST, supra note 88, No. 76 (Alexander Hamilton), at 391-95). 
 110. Id. at 291 (discussing FEDERALIST, supra note 88, No. 51 (James Madison) at 391-95). 
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experience has vindicated the sagacity of Publius on this point, and presidents have 
held serve.111 However, Levinson prophetically wonders whether increased polari-
zation might eventually encourage the Senate to withhold its concurrence indefi-
nitely, an idea recently advanced by Republican Senators with respect to the current 
vacancy on the Supreme Court.112 
Under the pressure of partisanship, the presidency arguably has become mo-
narchical, which worries Levinson.113 Presidents have exceeded their authority and 
arrogated legislative powers.114 To avoid nomination battles with the Senate, presi-
dents increasingly have used recess appointments, and to accommodate themselves, 
have stretched the definition of “recess.”115 A president could not declare war as 
monarchs could, Publius says, but Levinson reminds us that repeatedly presidents 
have exercised war powers since World War II, never with a congressional declara-
tion of war and sometimes without even the concurrence of the Congress.116 
By measuring the handiwork and arguments of Publius against present day 
problems, Levinson wants to spur our own “reflection and choice,” so that we can 
be our own Publius, and advance our own bold solutions.117 In this vein, he finds 
“the most truly inspiring passage” in all of the essays in Federalist 14, where Publius 
rejects, “‘the unnatural voice’ that ‘petulantly tells you that the form of government 
recommended for your adoption is a novelty in the political world . . . that it rashly 
attempts what it is impossible to accomplish.’”118 Levinson also believes we also 
should not fear innovation.119 We should inquire into “what improvements are 
necessary in our own time.”120 He asks, does not Publius say that the chains of the 
Constitution “are made to be broken when circumstances demand it?”121 In short, 
he uses Publius against Publius. 
However, Levinson respects the constitutionally prescribed means by which 
we modify government. Although he objects to parts of our present Constitution, 
he is a constitutionalist; nowhere does he endorse end-runs around the Constitu-
tion, and he shares the concern of Publius in Federalist 50 that “parchment barri-
ers” will not prevent partisan encroachments against, and usurpations of properly 
assigned powers, as contemporary examples demonstrate.122 For this reason, life-
time tenure of federal judges worries Levinson, even more than Publius. A possibil-
ity that Publius foresaw in Federalist 78 has come to pass, that judges might smug-
                                                          
 111. LEVINSON, supra note 3, at 291. 
 112. Id. at 250-51. 
 113. Id. at 255. 
 114. Id. at 260. 
 115. Id. at 257-60. 
 116. LEVINSON, supra note 3, at 268-69 (discussing FEDERALIST, supra note 88, No. 69 (Alexander Hamilton), at 
355-62). 
 117. Id. at 53 (quoting FEDERALIST, supra note 88, No. 1 (Alexander Hamilton), at 1). 
 118. Id. at 52 (quoting FEDERALIST, supra note 88, No. 14 (James Madison), at 66. 
 119. Id. at 53-54. 
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gle their own legislative preferences into their decisions and “might be ‘disposed to 
exercise WILL instead of JUDGMENT.’”123 
Levinson’s open endorsement of breaking the chains of the Constitution 
when circumstances demand it, raises the important question, whether he wants to 
change the form of the political regime that the Constitution was meant to estab-
lish, or whether he wishes to improve it. Whatever the Constitution’s flaws, Publius 
clearly expects that the government formed under the Constitution will be republi-
can in form, which Levinson acknowledges in his commentary on Federalist 39.124 
There, Levinson calls out the word “indirectly” in the definition Publius gives for 
republican government: “‘a government which derives all its powers directly or indi-
rectly from the great body of the people . . . .’”125 In contrast to Publius, Levinson 
would prefer that “all primary political leaders are popularly elected,” which is clear 
when he reviews the democratic deficits of Congress and the Electoral College.126 
He does not agree with the argument that the indirect election of presidents and 
senators promotes wisely administered government, while simultaneously insuring 
that the public servants are accountable to the people. For him, the distance be-
tween the people and the public servants should not be remote. Publius and Levin-
son both support the genus of republicanism but Levinson, unlike Publius, favors 
the species of democratic republicanism, or democracy. However, at this time in 
American political history, the difference between the straight republicanism of 
Publius and the democratic republicanism of Levinson is immaterial, because creep-
ing monarchism in our system threatens all species of republicanism. 
First, the emergence of the powerful presidency, as Levinson depicts it, is part 
of an historical trend that is ongoing. A reformed Congress that is structured and 
elected in perfect harmony with Levinson’s democratic ideas changes little for the 
better if the legislative branch continues to lose power to the executive branch. The 
monarchic presidency developed first, because the Constitution failed to include 
sufficient barriers that might have contained the early presidents. Due to this error, 
the presidents acquired new power for the office through neither constitutional nor 
unconstitutional means, but rather, through extra-constitutional means. They seized 
greater authority because they could. The earliest presidents upheld the original 
theory of the presidency and vetoed only bills that they deemed unconstitutional. 
Then, they vetoed bills that were disagreeable to their policy preferences. Woodrow 
Wilson then formalized the practice of Theodore Roosevelt, who appealed directly 
to the people, to force a legislative agenda on Congress.127 
Now the monarchic form of the presidency that Levinson describes treads on 
unconstitutional territory. Levinson documents a recent controversy that points to 
the next major transition in the presidency from initiator of legislation to legislator. 
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Pressed to do something about unauthorized foreign residents, President Obama 
“rebuffed earlier calls by political liberals to act, by reminding them that he was not 
a ‘king.’”128 After his re-election, Obama famously began warning Congress that he 
had “a pen and a phone.” He acted. If the assertion of executive power in this fash-
ion becomes accepted, the strategic balance between the Congress and the presi-
dency further shifts. In that event, the role of Congress would begin to transition 
from authoring law to influencing law, or in other words, towards the role of the 
later Roman Senate, which finally became a rubber-stamp to the Caesars. 
The seizure and exercise of greater authority by the executive is not the exclu-
sive deed of the executive, but is encouraged by the bloc that favors a particular 
policy. Levinson notes that President Obama first resisted political liberals who 
were pressuring him to act.129 Similarly, Levinson remarks that the American colo-
nists “were in fact highly critical of King George for not exercising what they insist-
ed was his continuing power to veto laws passed by Parliament.”130 The point that 
Levinson wants to make in this context is that republicans in America found them-
selves oddly defending the dead “Stuart theory of the British monarchy,” a memory 
preserved by the reference to the nonexistent king’s veto in Federalist 69. The larg-
er, unstated point substantiated by the two episodes is that policy partisanship can 
influence the developmental direction of the political regime in ways that the policy 
partisans might not initially recognize in the heat of political struggle, and that they 
might later rue after their policy battle is won. Power abhors a vacuum, and if policy 
partisans can win by gaining the aid of a sympathetic princely power within the sys-
tem, they will seek it. The American presidency has certainly demonstrated suscep-
tibility to accumulate power in this way. 
Second, the advancement of the politically popular idea of good government 
that Levinson advocates contributes to strengthening the new monarchism that 
chafes against his democratic principles. Levinson openly shares his political views. 
He favors a strong national government that takes up good works for the general 
welfare, and weights passages that support his object.131 In Federalist 45 Publius 
argues for the subordination of state sovereignty to the union for “the public good, 
the real welfare of the great body of the people.”132 Levinson uses this part of the 
text to oppose “absurdly sacrificing the ends set out in the Preamble for a fetishistic 
piety toward what later generations would call ‘states’ rights.’”133 Addressing the 
concern that the citizenry might not obey the national government in Federalist 27, 
Publius dismisses this possibility, reassuring his reader that “the general government 
will be better administered than the particular governments.”134 In other words, 
Levinson says, “The more one becomes accustomed to the new government. . . the 
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more it will take on the status of a friend whose ministrations are to be embraced 
rather than feared.”135 In support of securing adequate revenues in Federalist 30, 
Publius writes, “A complete power [is] indispensable.”136 Without revenues, Levin-
son comments, “polities inevitably decline.”137 
But the goal of the partisan opponents of Levinson is to “‘drown’ the national 
government by starving it of tax revenues.”138 According to him, these partisans see 
“the [national administrative] state as an affront to, rather than a guarantor of ‘civi-
lization.’”139 They oppose the creation of “a better-functioning national bureaucra-
cy” and sufficient taxes that would pay “administrators truly adequate salaries.”140 
Bedeviled by “anti-governmental radicalism,” he wonders, “Can any political system 
survive – at least without indeed calling on force of arms to quell popular discon-
tent. . .?” Against these partisans, Levinson argues, Publius “was not a libertarian 
who saw the government’s role as limited to providing for the common defense. He 
consistently adopts a robust notion of government.”141 
We can trace Levinson’s idea of good government back to Woodrow Wilson. 
For Wilson, good government should incorporate a robust national administration 
managed by educated experts, and he looked to Europe for his model.142 Although 
he admits that the European monarchies developed the administrative state, he re-
assures his hearers that if we engraft this feature into American Government, the 
change will not bend the American regime towards monarchy.143 We would borrow 
the European idea and democratize it. Given Levinson’s concern that the executive 
branch has developed towards monarchy, it might be fair to ask whether the devel-
opment of the administrative state instead has monarchized us, a development that 
Levinson dislikes. 
Levinson recognizes that defenders of states’ rights and limited government 
stand in the way of completing the construction of a powerful, centralized adminis-
trative state that he wishes to see built. He does not inquire whether the achieve-
ment of this goal will alter the republican character of the American political re-
gime. But near the end of his life, Madison explained the importance of federalism 
to the maintenance of republicanism. The purpose of dividing the powers of gov-
ernment in twain was to insure the perpetuity of self-government “over the parts 
and over the whole, notwithstanding the great extent of the whole.”144 The value of 
federalism is that it maintains republican self-government over a large territory, not 
to preserve provincialism or state pride at the expense of a broadly national cosmo-
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politanism, as Levinson suggests.145 Therefore, the loss of self-government in the 
parts for the sake of centralized state-building is a serious change to the political re-
gime. 
Federalism is simply a device for structuring republican government that 
solves the problem of size; and, that is its sole but essential value. A cardinal princi-
ple of republicanism is that the people or their representatives upon whom the law 
operates must be the makers of the law. In a large nation of 320 million dispersed 
people, the requisite of this principle is met, if the whole people or the representa-
tives of the whole decide the question whether to go to war, because war affects the 
whole nation. If the question is whether to build an eleven-mile road in one corner 
of that nation, affecting only 700,000 people of that state, the principle is violated if 
the whole people decide the question, because the people of the state upon whom 
the law operates constitute a tiny fraction of the makers of the law. It does not mat-
ter if the purest democratic means are employed by the whole people to decide the 
question. The net effect is that an outside power makes the law for the people who 
must obey the law, and when an outside power governs, it is not self-government, 
but imperial government. 
No republic had ever been so large as the United States in 1776, and so their 
problem of preserving self-government and preventing imperial government of the 
whole over the parts was new and unique. To implement their solution of dividing 
government, Madison continued, they had to decide where to draw “the untried 
demarcation of the line which divides the general and the particular Governments,” 
and this was a “most arduous and delicate task.”146 In form, the method by which 
they effected the division was “an enumeration and definition of the powers,” most 
visible in Article I, section 8. He added, “the success of this new scheme . . . . de-
pends on the faithful observance of this partition of powers,” and “the friends of 
liberty and of man, cannot be too often earnestly exhorted to be watchful in mark-
ing and controlling encroachments by either of the Governments on the domain of 
the other.” 
In an earlier day, the watchful friends of liberty fought Calhoun and his aco-
lytes who upset the delicate balance and assigned greater weight to the states. The 
political purpose of these apostates of constitutional fidelity was to protect their rul-
ing state oligarchies from the reforming arm of the national government. But Lev-
inson sees a nominal, and not a major difference in substance between the theories 
of Calhoun and Madison, despite the fact that Madison reviewed the theories of the 
former, and denied their author could be “within the pale of the republican 
faith.”147 Unfortunately, many defenders of state self-government today also con-
flate Madison and Calhoun, Founding theory and Confederate theory, as Levinson 
notes.148 This conflation of the sacred and profane has unjustly discredited the orig-
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inal theory, which deserves a fair hearing, because in our day, the balance is upset in 
the other direction. The purpose of those, like Levinson, who endorse tipping the 
balance against the states, is founded on well-intended aims to gratify “the remark-
able sweep of services we now demand from a national government.”149 The de-
mand for greater services and the organization of government to supply them meets 
the conditions of a theory of de Tocqueville, that the repeated satisfactions of 
popular demand for succor incrementally strengthens central powers, with the re-
sult that soft despotism could grow out of democracy itself.150 Equality might be 
retained, but the people would be equally subjected to despotism, stripped of liber-
ty. 
In Federalist 46, Publius addresses the concern that the federal government 
might extend an unwarrantable jurisdiction over the states, and that the national 
government might dominate the whole system. In reply to this concern, Levinson 
asks, “So what?”151 Imperial government and the loss of liberty, that’s what. If the 
national government assumes all powers formerly divided between state and na-
tional government and, combined with this change, national power is concentrated 
in the executive, supported by a vast bureaucracy unaccountable to the people, the 
result is a potent monarchic concoction. But Levinson is too interested in the good 
works that a national bureaucracy could achieve to see that the success of his politi-
cal aims will produce more of what he dislikes; the effects of completing the demo-
lition of state self-government cannot be reconciled with his democratic convic-
tions. 
Pushed forward by political movement of this kind, the American political re-
gime has traveled back to its pre-revolutionary origins. In Our Declaration Allen 
writes that Jefferson’s Summary View of the Rights of British America was a “preview” of 
the Declaration, arguing that the British Parliament “had no authority over the col-
onies.”152 The fundamental problem denounced by the Summary View was imperial 
rule, which is to say, rule over and not self-rule.153 The laws that the Americans 
were forced to observe were not the laws of their own making, as republicanism 
demands. What was their recourse? The same recourse available to my fellow citi-
zens in Alaska today, when they are told by the federal government, and do not de-
cide, whether they may build an eleven-mile road to save Alaskan lives, and when 
they are told by the federal government, and do not decide, where the line should 
be drawn between environmental stewardship and the development of their strug-
gling local economy. Their recourse is to travel 4,000 miles to supplicate an admin-
istration that haughtily waves the Supremacy Clause at them, just as Benjamin 
Franklin traveled 4,000 miles to supplicate the haughty imperial administration in 
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1774.154 The scene of Franklin’s debasement in the Privy Council is, unfortunately, 
too often repeated in ordinary Americans’ interactions with their government today. 
Americans then and now know they cannot exercise “reflection and choice” 
and decide many important questions that interest them infinitely more than federal 
administrators, who nevertheless decide for them, and are many degrees beyond di-
rect accountability to local people. We should not wonder that, fatigued by frustra-
tion, the American people turn away from political life, lose the interest and capaci-
ty to debate and vote, and indeed, lose the vitality of a flourishing free people when 
the responsibility for self-government is taken from them. Levinson does not rec-
ognize the possibility that the enervating effect of the administrative state on citi-
zenship is the cause of his doubt that the people are really capable of “reflection 
and choice.” In other words, the administrative state becomes self-justifying. In 
similar fashion, the debilitating effect of slavery on human beings drove slavehold-
ers’ doubt in natural equality, and chattel slavery became self-justifying. 
Nor should we wonder at the agitations of other citizens who have not for-
gotten their patrimony and persist in demanding it back, nor that these citizens run 
into a wall of self-interested opposition. The administrative state has created in-
comes, interests and dependencies; in sum, another class of citizens who are the 
beneficiaries, and are interested in preserving the new system of government that 
provides the benefactions. This wedge deliberately driven into the heart of the 
American people also has antecedents in pre-revolutionary America. In his Novan-
glus letters, John Adams calls out Americans who were working against American 
liberty for the sake of gaining a place on the imperial payroll.155 Can we blame 
Americans today, if they see circumstances similar to that of our forebears and tend 
towards defiance? Jefferson went farther. He directly addressed the king in the 
Summary View, invoked natural right, declared the imperial laws void, and in closing, 
wrote “Let those flatter who fear; it is not an American art.”156 
The remedy that emerges from the Summary View is a complete reinterpreta-
tion of the British political order, in which the colonies would govern themselves 
with regard to local concerns, and become a co-equal and integral part of the British 
union presided by the king. The division of government in Jefferson’s reinterpreted 
British order is the same plan upon which the provisions in the Constitution stand. 
That plan, Madison said at the end of his life, was to divide and organize “power as 
will provide at once for its harmonious exercise on the true principles of liberty.”157 
Madison singled out that feature and the moral foundation of the republic, rooted 
in the consent of the people, as “the two vital characteristics of the political system 
of the United States.”158 Standing on that moral foundation and holding that plan 
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for a government that protected liberty, many Americans then said to London, as 
today they say to Washington, D.C., “We are your equals!”159 
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